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1. Introduction 
The definition of pain promulgated by the International Association for the Study of Pain (Box 
1) has provided a powerful conceptual anchor for scientific and healthcare professional advances 
in understanding the nature and treatment of acute and chronic pain.  Based on work by Merskey 
in 1964 [22], it has been widely endorsed and even more widely used [27], with the primary text 
unchanged since first published in 1979 [15].  Since then there have been substantial advances in 
our understanding of pain, in assessment and treatment, employing a multidisciplinary 
perspective, and emergence of chronic disease models. These advances instantiate the 
biopsychosocial perspective on pain that was required to capture evidence-based understanding 
and the evolution of pain care. While the IASP definition was under development, Melzack and 
Wall (1965) published “Pain Mechanisms: A New Theory” in Science [21], generating a 
revolution in our understanding of pain mechanisms and management [16].   
 
In light of these advances, a review of the definition of pain seems warranted.  We provide a 
rationale explaining why a revised definition better captures the essence of what we presently 
understand to be pain and how it would better equip those who try to control pain.  The 
following definition is proposed:  
Pain is a distressing experience associated with actual or potential tissue damage with 
sensory, emotional, cognitive and social components. 
 
Box 1 about here 
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2.  
 The current definition 
A definition needs to ‘describe a thing according to its properties’ [5], identifying what it is and 
is not, providing direction for scientific understanding and, in this case, for clinical interventions.  
Does the current definition describe essential and fundamental properties?  Does it differentiate 
pain from other ‘things’ or events?  Without criteria for adequacy, the user must decide.   
 
The current definition has enjoyed widespread use, but not without criticism and some revisions 
to the Note. Careful inspection reveals strengths and difficulties. It effectively describes the 
essential subjectivity of pain experience, differentiating it from physiological processes, although 
at another level of understanding, biological mechanisms govern that experience. It facilitates 
appreciation of the multidimensional nature of pain by specifying both sensory and emotional 
features; including emotion was a major advance over an exclusively sensory focus on pain 
[21,23].  The definition is brief and succinct, supporting easy use. It has provided a common 
understanding of a serious health problem across a remarkable diversity of scholarly, scientific 
and health care professions.   
 
An essential feature is the assertion that pain is associated with actual or potential tissue damage, 
denoting this as a necessary characteristic of the experience, but also recognizing that events 
other than tissue damage can serve as determinants, consistent with a biopsychosocial model of 
pain [12,13], and encouraging specification of multiple causal factors beyond tissue pathology.   
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Perhaps the most elusive part of the definition is its final phrase, “or described in terms of such 
damage”.  This was intended to acknowledge complaints of people experiencing pain without 
evidence of tissue stress or damage, despite thorough investigation [22], and, as a political 
manoeuver, the phrase provided necessary validation for many people with chronic pain.  
Mounting evidence of neuroplastic changes in peripheral and central nervous systems and the 
brain during transition from acute to chronic pain supports the wisdom of this decision, 
acknowledging the reality of pain in the absence of a pathophysiological basis, but perhaps these 
purposes place it outside the definition.  
 
There should be good reasons to modify a widely used definition. We suggest three. First, 
acknowledging only sensory and emotional features excludes major and clinically important 
characteristics, in particular, cognitive and social components. These components are often 
considered to be characteristic of chronic pain and can be overlooked in understanding acute 
pain, despite much evidence to the contrary [19,21,26]. Second, characterizing the experience 
simply as “unpleasant” falls short: most acute or chronic clinically problematic pain is more than 
“unpleasant” and the term potentially trivializes severe pain.  Finally, subjectivity and self-report 
are prioritized at the expense of nonverbal behaviors, prominent sources of information about 
pain in human and nonhuman animals, particularly those whose subjective experience cannot be 
communicated. 
 
3.  Defining features of pain experience 
In the 21st Century, behavioral science and neuroscience have moved beyond introspection and 
description to acknowledge perceptual, affective and cognitive features of experience. To focus 
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on sensation and affect in the study of pain in nonhuman animals ignores a mounting 
understanding of animal cognition [19] and social behavior [26], but the main cost is explicit 
disregard for human cognitive abilities to influence both internal somatic environments (e.g., 
through descending inhibitory controls and self-regulation) and the external physical and social 
environment. Failure to acknowledge this feature of pain is a serious problem. 
 
3.1 Cognition 
The healthy dispute over the primacy of cognition or emotion in explaining human 
behavior [30,46] highlights the importance of both, long recognized in pain [36]. Interest in the 
nature of painful experience has drawn extensively on cognitive science methodologies [28], 
including from attention [10], memory [11] and language use [35].  Further, the human capacity 
for cognitive elaboration of pain is prominent when considering suffering, pain expression, and 
social parameters of pain [7,37].  Brain imaging increasingly enriches our study of subjective 
experience, demonstrating dynamic serial and parallel activity widely distributed in the brain [4], 
including important frontal lobe executive processes (e.g. 44). 
 
Interest in structure and content of cognitive processes addresses experience: what is the 
individual thinking about when in pain? Self-report demonstrates a broad range of content 
beyond intensity [37], incorporating “nociception, emotion, decision-making, self-awareness, 
social cognition, and communicative tendencies” [45].  Subjective experience of pain can include 
perception of internal somatic events as well as experience of prior, current and anticipated 
environments. Because self-report is largely under personal control, it provides a medium for 
influencing the environment in the individual’s perceived best interests. Facial and other 
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behavioral expression of pain are also multidimensional—for example, facial expression can 
disclose various emotional and motivational states, as well as cognitive features, such as 
intentions, efforts at problem solving and social reactions [41].   
 
Content of experience is a major focus of interventions using cognitive and behavioral methods 
[43]. Several important models, particularly those based on fear and avoidance [8] and focussing 
on catastrophic thinking [38], have identified important pain-associated beliefs and cognitive 
biases, with emotional and behavioral consequences, including decrements in cognitive 
processing.   
 
3.2 Sociality 
The definition also fails to acknowledge social dimensions, major features of human pain [6,13] 
and identified in nonhuman animals, including the rodents extensively used in developing 
analgesics [18,19,26,40].  Humans are the quintessential social animal: big sophisticated brains 
evolved in progenitor hominids and homo sapiens to process complex demands of competition 
and cooperation [17].  Social environments determine exposure to pain, thoughts and feelings 
when in pain, communication of distress to others, and others’ experience and responses [6,13]. 
We remind readers that health care delivery systems and all human and some animal pain studies 
are inherently social.  A biopsychosocial model of pain requires explicit acknowledgement of 
sociality. 
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3.3 In summary 
The existing definition is partial rather than complete, omitting essential qualities necessary to 
promote good science and optimal health care. Its originators achieved a great deal, but reflected 
their times; the intervening 50 years of research and clinical advances in pain need to be 
incorporated, directing attention to key concerns. Including cognitive and social dimensions 
provides a balanced and more comprehensive perspective. Further, we need to move beyond the 
primacy of pain complaint [1], an important but distracting political and rhetorical feature of the 
original definition, and recognize that pain has functional, adaptive value through a broader 
range of nonverbal behaviors.   
 
4. Facilitating assessment in research and clinical settings 
The definition is, appropriately, the foundation of assessment methods and practices. Unfortunate 
features of the original definition were (1) the implication that self-report was the standard, and 
(2) failure to address dimensions of pain assessment directly. Although self-report in humans 
allows rich communication about pain, in practice, pain scientists and clinicians often focus on 
unidimensional, sensory intensity [37].  In contrast, effective clinicians integrate extensive 
patient self-report with their assessment of nonverbal behaviors, aspects of voice, body activity 
and facial activity, to enhance understanding. We need to acknowledge that any clinical 
assessment is, effectively, a social event [33], with self-report more than a ‘readout’ of an 
internal state; but a verbal behavior subject to contextual influence. Further, the definition’s 
focus on self-report has rightly been criticized [1] for excluding humans who cannot describe 
their experience, because of underdeveloped or impaired cognitive capacities, or because they 
have no adequate language. Fortunately, the Note was revised in 2002 to acknowledge the 
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importance of attending to pain in people unable to make self-report [14]. The central 
requirement of self-report also precludes assessment of pain in animals, at odds with much pain 
and analgesic research [9,39] and the evolutionary continuum [42]. 
 
Removing references to assessment processes from the definition to the Note section is 
preferable. We recommend incorporating reference to a broad range of behaviors [20,31] in all 
assessment, encouraging broader assessment than self-report. Respect for ethnic and cultural 
diversity also requires attention to behavior in pain. Nonverbal behaviors associated with pain 
are no more closely correlated with evidence of tissue damage than self-report and often have 
only a weak relationship with reported pain; better to consider self-report as only one of many 
behaviors communicating painful distress. Very few behaviors are specific to pain, and we have 
little understanding of the diverse functions of behaviors associated with pain [29,41], which 
may be classified using the dimensions reflexive/automatic vs purposive/controlled [7], or 
protective and/or communicative [38]. Across studies of vertebrates and invertebrate animals, 
some types of adaptive behavior are consistently reported in acute injury and during recovery 
[39]. For human and non-human animals, technology increasingly offers automated detection 
and assessment of various behaviors associated with pain [2.3.34,25], an otherwise labour-
intensive data collection task subject to bias and observation errors. 
 
5. Usefulness of the Note 
The Note also requires revision.  We attend here only to problematic elements, not reiterating 
positive components. Some features of the Note are redundant, neither qualifying it nor adding 
information: reiterating that pain is subjective; restating the defining feature of tissue damage; 
Copyright  2016 by the International Association for the Study of Pain. Unauthorized reproduction of this article is prohibited.
AC
CE
PT
ED
9 
 
repeating that it is both a sensation and an emotional experience. Other features elaborate on the 
definition without directing the reader to a clear model or practice. 1) The argument that reports 
of pain in the absence of tissue damage or any likely pathophysiological cause are probably 
psychological is outdated; neuroplasticity provides an explanation and supports the 
recommendations in the Note to attend to subjective experience. 2) Psychological phenomena, 
such as substantial emotional reactions to clinically straightforward pain, problematic thinking 
styles, widespread avoidance with adverse effects, and disrupted social relationships, also occur 
in patients with diagnosable tissue pathology. 3)  Ruling out certain experiences as not painful, 
e.g., pricking sensations or dysesthesias, is overly conservative and confusing where these are 
reported as part of the pain experience. 4) The observation that pain must be assessed in those 
unable to communicate verbally is not explicit about nonverbal communication; above we argue 
that nonverbal communication plays a role in all clinical assessment and in research assessment 
of pain.   
 
The proposed definition accords with Merskey’s injunction, “All that is needed is to define pain 
in terms of what we experience as pain and leave it at that” (p. 25) [23].  Our modification 
reasserts the importance of subjective experience, attaches importance to thoughts and social 
considerations as well as sensations and emotions, acknowledges variability of the essential 
aversive quality in use of the word “distressing”, and removes reference to assessing pain, 
acknowledging it in the Note.  In a revised Note, we recommend emphasizing behavior in all 
assessment; deleting the implication that psychological problems occur only where there is no 
tissue damage, and avoiding dualistic distinctions.  
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In closing, we aim to generate debate and discussion that will lead to an improved definition, 
serving all researchers and clinicians better in their work in pain, and engaging those outside the 
pain field whose knowledge and disciplines may enrich our understanding.  
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